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THE 1983 ABORTION DECISIONS:1 CLARIFICATION OF THE
PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF ABORTION REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 1983, the United States Supreme Court once again ad-
dressed the abortion issue, handing down its decisions in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,2 Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Ashcroft,3 and Simopoulos v. Virginia.4 The 1983 Abortion Decisions
were an unequivocal reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade5 and the principle that
a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion. On a higher level of
analysis, these decisions are significant because they clarify how the Roe
doctrine applies to procedural restrictions on abortion.6
In the past ten years, the Supreme Court has addressed three general
categories of statutory abortion restrictions: (1) funding restrictions;' (2)
third-party consent and notification requirements;8 and (3) procedural re-
quirements.' The first two categories are beyond the scope of the present
1. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S.
Ct. 2532 (1983). For purposes of this comment, these three decisions will be referred to
collectively as the 1983 Abortion Decisions.
2. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
4. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe decision was not without its critics. See, e.g., Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). But see Tribe,
Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1973). This comment assumes the correctness of Roe's holding that the right to abortion is
fundamental.
6. For purposes of this comment, "procedural restrictions, regulations, or requirements"
shall refer to state-imposed mental and physical health-related regulations dictating proce-
iudres that must be followed before, during, and after an abortion. They include, but are not
limited to, regulations with respect to informed consent, mandatory waiting periods, qualifi-
cations of the abortion facility, qualifications of the attending physician, and record-keep-
ing. Procedural restrictions, regulations, or requirements do not include spousal or parental
consent requirements, which involve interests of third parties and not simply a state's
health related concerns.
7. Williams v. Zbarez, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977).
8. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
9. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S.
Ct. 2532 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410
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comment. The remaining category, procedural requirements, is distinct in
two respects. First, challenges to procedural requirements not only raise
the general issue of the fundamental right to abortion, but they often
require application of Roe's trimester framework, 10 the analytical basis
for balancing the state's interest against the woman's fundamental right.
Second, until the 1983 Abortion Decisions, the Supreme Court had ex-
amined the application of the trimester framework only once"' since its
articulation. Thus, lower courts have struggled to define its dimensions,
often with conflicting results. 2 In light of these distinctions, the 1983
Abortion Decisions constitute an important step in the development of
the abortion privacy doctrine.
The purpose of this comment is to highlight how the 1983 Abortion
Decisions explain and expand upon the Roe doctrine as it applies to pro-
cedural restrictions. Particular emphasis will be placed on the Court's
clarifications regarding the application of Roe's trimester framework. In
addition, this comment will address the major questions that remain af-
ter, or spring from, the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements on abor-
tion. Many of these questions are crystallized in Justice Blackmun's sepa-
rate opinion in Ashcroft," concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
in Justice O'Connor's vehement dissent in Akron.' 4
II. SEEDS SOWN IN Roe, Doe, AND Danforth
Roe v. Wade held that the fundamental right to privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."' As a fundamental right, the abortion decision is subject to
state limitation only when the limitation is (1) supported by a compelling
state interest, and (2) "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."' Having identified protection of maternal health
and potential life as the two legitimate state interests underlying abortion
regulation, 7 the Roe Court outlined the trimester framework to define
the point at which these state interests become compelling.
The Court reasoned that a state's interests in protecting maternal
health is not compelling until approximately the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy, because the mortality rate from first-trimester abortions is
U.S. 179 (1973).
10. See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
11. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
12. See infra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 2526.
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
15. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
16. Id. at 155.
17. Id. at 150.
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as low as or lower than that for women in childbirth.18 Thus, during the
first trimester, the "physician, in consultation with his patient," must
have the freedom to make the abortion decision and to effectuate that
decision without interference by the state. Following this line of logic, the
Court concluded that the state interest in maternal health is compelling
during the second and third trimesters because the risks from abortion
increase as the pregnancy approaches term. During the second and third
trimesters the state may regulate the abortion procedure "to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health."20
The state's interest in potential life becomes compelling at the begin-
ning of the third trimester because only at this stage of pregnancy is the
fetus capable "of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 21 During
the third trimester the state's interest in potential life outweighs the
pregnant woman's right to abortion, and the state "may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother."'2' Under this framework of analy-
sis, the Roe Court struck down the Texas abortion statute13 which re-
stricted lawful abortions only to those performed to save the life of the
mother, because the statute made "no distinction between abortions per-
formed early in pregnancy and those performed later. . . ."" and limited
the legal justification for an abortion to saving the life of the mother.'5
In Doe v. Bolton,'26 the Court focused on three procedural requirements
of Georgia's abortion statute:2" (1) that all abortions be performed in a
hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals (JCAH);2s (2) that all abortions be approved in advance by an abor-
18. Id. at 163. Because of the development of the dilation and evacuation (D & E) abor-
tion procedure (see City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct.
at 2496), abortions performed in the first half of the second trimester are as safe as first-
trimester abortions, but this development has not resulted in an abandonment of the tri-
mester framework. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
20. Id. The Court suggested that regulations regarding the performing physician's qualifi-
cations or the type of facility in which the abortion could be performed would be permissi-
ble at this stage. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 163-64.
23. TEXAs STAT. ANN. arts. 1191 to 1194, 1196 (recodified as arts. 4512.1 to 4512.4 (Vernon
1973)).
24. 410 U.S. at 164.
25. Id.
26. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
27. Doe also addresses challenges to portions of Georgia's abortion statute on grounds of
unconstitutional vagueness, id. at 191; violation of the right to travel, id. at 200; and viola-
tion of equal protection, id. at 200-01. These challenges are beyond the scope of the abortion
privacy doctrine.
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(4) (1968) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202
1983]
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tion committee composed of no fewer than three members of the hospi-
tal's staff;29 and (3) that two other physicians concur in writing with the
performing physician's medical judgment that an abortion is necessary.30
The Court struck down the latter two provisions using vague language
suggesting both substantive due process and equal protection grounds. 1
Essentially, the Court determined that neither provision served a legiti-
mate state interest;32 therefore, the higher level of scrutiny implicit in the
trimester framework was unnecessary.
Addressing the hospitalization requirement of the statute, the Doe
Court applied the first prong of the trimester framework and held, on
narrow grounds, that the provision was unconstitutional because it did
not exempt first-trimester abortions.3 Georgia had no compelling interest
in requiring first-trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth34 provided ample opportunity for the
Supreme Court to clarify the permissible limits of state regulation of
abortion. The Court's examination of Missouri's abortion regulations pro-
scribing saline abortions 5 and imposing informed consent3 6 and reporting
requirements7 is of particular significance. In holding that the saline
abortion proscription was unconstitutional, the Danforth Court expressed
what had merely been implied in Roe and Doe - that a regulation bur-
dening the abortion decision during the second trimester will be scruti-
nized by the Court even though it is supported by the compelling state
interest in maternal health.3 8 If the regulation is not narrowly tailored to
serve this compelling interest, it violates due process. This portion of the
decision also demonstrated the great deference the Court accords ac-
cepted medical practice in determining whether a second-trimester regu-
(1973)).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(5) (1968).
30. Id. § 26-1202(b)(3).
31. In striking down these provisions, the Doe Court noted that they were redundant
measures to achieve the state's purported interest. This analysis suggests the substantive
due process principle that the state, in regulating a fundamental right, must choose the
narrowest means possible. In addition, the Court noted that no other medical procedure in
Georgia was so regulated, thus suggesting an equal protection argument. 410 U.S. at 197,
199. See also Note, Due Process and Equal Protection: Constitutional Implications of
Abortion Notice and Reporting Requirements, 56 B.U.L. REv. 522, 527-28 (1976).
32. 410 U.S. at 197, 199.
33. Id. at 195. In dictum, the Court suggested that the hospitalization requirement was
not reasonably related to the state interest in maternal health and implied that the hospital-
ization requirement would not necessarily have been upheld even if it had excluded the first
trimester. Id.
34. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
35. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.050 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1979).
36. Id. § 188.020(2).
37. Id. §§ 188.050, 188.060.
38. 428 U.S. at 76-79.
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lation is sufficiently related to the compelling state interest.39
The analysis of Missouri's informed consent and reporting require-
ments in Danforth is noteworthy because, although the provisions applied
to all stages of pregnancy, the Court upheld the requirements without
applying the trimester framework.40 With respect to the informed consent
requirement, the Court noted that the decision to have an abortion "is an
important, and often a stressful one. .. ."' and concluded that a state
has the right to assure that a woman makes the decision with full aware-
ness of its significance.42 Thus, in some instances, an abortion regulation
is permissible even though it is unsupported by a compelling interest in
maternal health and potential life.
The Court's discussion of the reporting requirements 43 clarifies the cir-
cumstances in which a procedural regulation may be constitutional re-
gardless of the stage of pregnancy it affects. The Court concluded that
Missouri's reporting requirements were not constitutionally offensive be-
cause they were related to the state's interest in protecting maternal
health, and because they resulted in "no legally significant impact or con-
sequence on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient
relationship." 44
Taken together, Roe, Doe, and Danforth demonstrate three principles
defining the constitutional limits on abortion procedural regulations.
First, if the regulation promotes no legitimate state interest, it is uncon-
stitutional45 and no further scrutiny is required. Second, if the procedural
regulation is supported by a legitimate state interest and has no "legally
significant impact" on the abortion decision, it is constitutional on its
face and requires no stricter scrutiny in order to be upheld.' Finally, if
the regulation furthers a legitimate state interest but also burdens the
abortion decision or its effectuation, the stricter standard of scrutiny ap-
plies.47 Thus, in order for an abortion regulation to be valid, the state
must show a compelling state interest, as defined by the trimester frame-
work, and a reasonable relationship between this state interest and the
regulation.
39. Id. at 77-78. The Court noted that the saline procedure was used in 68% to 80% of all
post-first-trimester abortions. It also observed that there was no evidence that the purport-
edly safer prostaglandin technique was available in Missouri. The prostaglandin technique,
like the saline procedure, involves an intra-amniotic injection that induces abortion. Id. at
77.
40. Id. at 67, 80-81.
41. Id. at 67.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 79-81.
44. Id. at 81.
45. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
46. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
47. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1983]
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III. CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS
The judicial principles of Roe, Doe, and Danforth did not deter the
efforts of the pro-life movement to enact restrictive abortion legislation
exploiting the ambiguities of these decisions. 48 In the years since Dan-
forth, lower courts have struggled with due process challenges to such leg-
islation, often with conflicting results. 49 Two key areas of confusion in the
courts are identifiable.
The first arises with respect to second-trimester hospitalization require-
ments.50 One source of this confusion derives from dictum in Roe, which
specifically mentioned hospitalization requirements as an example of per-
missible regulation during the second trimester. 1 Some courts have inter-
preted this statement to mean that hospitalization requirements after the
first trimester are per se constitutional. 2 Others have held that, while
48. See E. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS AND THE COURTS 130-38 (1982). It has been sug-
gested that one reason for the success in enacting such statutes is that some state legislators
are more concerned with keeping their constituencies happy than with the constitutionality
of a statute. See id. at 129. Janet Benshoof, Director of the Reproductive Freedom Project
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and leading advocate in the field of repro-
ductive rights, supported this view, citing her own conversation with a legislator who indi-
cated that legislators often rely on the judiciary to strike down questionable statutes that
they have enacted. Address by Janet Benshoof, Reproductive Rights Luncheon and Second
Annual Pro-Choice Awards sponsored by the Association of Virginia Planned Parenthood
Affiliates and the ACLU of Virginia, in Richmond, Va. (Oct. 7, 1983).
49. See infra notes 50-81 and accompanying text.
50. Second-trimester hospitalization requirements refer to requirements that all abortions
performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital rather than a free-standing
clinic. Compare Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,
1210 (6th Cir. 1981) (see infra note 53), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983);
Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. Ind. 1980)
(see infra note 52), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr,
451 U.S. 934 (1981); and Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (N.D. IM. 1978) (see infra
note 52), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); with Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 688-90 (8th Cir. 1981) (see infra note 53), affld
in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 26 (W.D.
Ky. 1980) (see infra note 54); and Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 196 (E.D. La.
1980) (see infra note 54).
51. [A] State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation rea-
sonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of
permissible state regulation in this area are requirements . . . as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may
be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status ....
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). See generally Note, Hospitalization Requirements for Second Tri-
mester Abortions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance? 71 GEO. L.J. 991 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D.
Ind. 1980) (holding a second-trimester hospitalization requirement constitutional under Roe
framework), affd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S.
934 (1981); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding a second-tri-
mester hospitalization requirement constitutional under Roe framework), a/I'd sub nom.
Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
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such requirements are not per se constitutional, the party challenging the
requirement must show that the requirement is unduly burdensome in
order to outweigh the state's compelling interest in protecting maternal
health. 53 Still other courts have looked to accepted medical practice in
order to determine whether the hospitalization requirement reasonably
relates to the state's interest in protecting maternal health.
5 4
Another source of confusion in the area of second-trimester hospitaliza-
tion requirements is the mixed signals sent by the Supreme Court. While
the Court's message in Roe, Doe, and Danforth is clear that the state
must not needlessly burden the woman's decision to have an abortion, the
Court's more recent decisions in Beal v. Doe,55 Maher v. Roe,56 and Har-
ris v. McRae,57 upholding government funding restrictions on abortion,58
have led some lower courts to believe that the strict scrutiny of the tri-
mester framework applies only if the procedural requirement creates a
direct obstacle to the abortion decision.5 For example, in Gary-North-
west Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen,60 the federal district court up-
held Indiana's hospitalization requirement on the theory that the burden
it imposed was analogous to that imposed by the funding restrictions up-
held in Harris v. McRae"1 and Maher v. Roe 62: "The obstacle which the
53. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 857 (8th Cir.) (in striking
down second-trimester hospitalization requirement, court held that plaintiff must show di-
rect and substantial burden before state must show compelling state interest), aff'd after
remand, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983);
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1204 (6th Cir.
1981) (in upholding second-trimester hospitalization requirement, court held that direct
state interference must be shown before strict scrutiny will be applied), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
54. See Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 24 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (striking down hospitaliza-
tion requirement because it reduces accessibility to the "safest" second-trimester procedure,
the D & E); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 194 (E.D. La. 1980) (second-trines-
ter hospitalization requirement not reasonably related to maternal health; state interest not
"compelling" prior to 18th week of pregnancy).
55. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
56. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
57. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
58. These cases stand for the principle that a state may deny financial assistance for
abortions, while granting it for childbirth. Such denial "places no governmental obstacle in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of
unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity
deemed in the public interest." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,
1204 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977), and holding that regula-
tion must amount to direct interference before strict scrutiny will apply), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F.
Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs.,
Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981).
60. 496 F. Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind.
Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981).
61. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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women face is not the hospitalization requirement, but the women's indi-
gency."63 The federal district court upheld the requirement without con-
sidering whether it was narrowly drawn to serve the state interest.6 The
fact that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's deci-
sion 65 added to the confusion in the lower courts.66
The second area producing conflicting results in the lower courts in-
volves the permissible limits of first-trimester procedural regulations.67
The conflict centers around determining how and when strict scrutiny of
first-trimester regulations is appropriate.6 8 Most frequently the issue has
arisen with respect to informed consent requirements and mandatory
waiting periods.69 Again, several approaches to determining the constitu-
tionality of such provisions have developed.
On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a dis-
trict court decision"0 that an informed consent requirement and
mandatory waiting period were unconstitutional because "the state's in-
terest was not compelling during the first trimester of pregnancy."7' On
the other hand, the Federal District Court for Maine has rejected this
approach.7' That court upheld an informed consent statute requiring that
the attending physician inform the woman of alternatives to abortion,
such as offering the child for adoption."3 Citing Maher v. Roe,7 4 the court
62. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
63. 496 F. Supp. at 901.
64. Id.
65. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981), afl'g mem.
Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
66. In Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1210
(6th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), the court relied on the
Supreme Court's affirmance of Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S.
934 (1981), in upholding Akron's second-trimester hospitalization requirement.
67. "First-trimester procedural regulations" refer to regulations, such as informed consent
requirements and mandatory waiting periods, which apply to all abortions, including those
in the early stages of pregnancy.
68. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784, 785 (7th Cir. 1980) (portions of informed
consent struck down; mandatory waiting period struck down); Womens Servs., P.C. v.
Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980) (informed consent and mandatory waiting period
struck down), vacated, 452 U.S. 911 (1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103
S. Ct. 3102 (1983); Wolfe v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523, 525, 526 (6th Cir. 1976) (informed
consent and mandatory waiting period upheld); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v.
Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548 (D. Me. 1979) (informed consent upheld; mandatory waiting
period struck down).
70. Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 452 U.S.
911 (1981), afl'd, 690 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3102 (1983).
71. Id. at 209 (noting with approval the determination of the district court, 483 F. Supp.
1022, 1049 (D. Neb. 1979), that the provision was unconstitutional because unsupported by
compelling state interest).
72. Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979).
73. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (1979).
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determined that the provision served "the state's legitimate interest in
encouraging childbirth and protecting a potential life. '7 5 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that the informed consent re-
quirement "unduly burdened" the woman's constitutional right; there-
fore, a rational relationship test between the legitimate state interest and
the abortion regulation was the appropriate level of scrutiny.76 In the
same decision, the court struck down a forty-eight hour mandatory wait-
ing period because the waiting period, in contrast to the informed consent
requirement, was clearly a "direct state interference" with the effectua-
tion of an abortion."7
In Charles v. Carey,78 in which an informed consent statute was again
at issue, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an "undue bur-
den" approach similar to that followed by the Federal District Court for
Maine. The court held that "the term 'undue burden' defines the ultimate
constitutional issue, not merely the threshold requirement for strict scru-
tiny."79 The court further stated that "[t]he threshold question whether
there is a 'burden' or 'direct interference' in the pregnancy termination
decision requires that the plaintiff merely show the requisite degree of
interference." 80 Having enunciated these principles, the court determined
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.8'
IV. THE 1983 ABORTION DECISIONS
Against this background of confusion, the United States Supreme
Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 2 Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,s 3 and Simopoulos v. Vir-
ginia. 8  Because the Court's primary focus in this trilogy is on second-
trimester hospitalization requirements and first-trimester procedural reg-
ulations, the decisions clarify the application of the trimester framework
and further define the permissible limits of first-trimester regulations. A
brief summary of the 1983 Abortion Decisions will provide the foundation
for analyzing their impact on the abortion privacy doctrine.
74. 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977).
75. 477 F. Supp. at 550.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 550-51.
78. 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 777.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 784. The court struck down a portion of Illinois' informed consent statute, stat-
ing that it constituted "an unconstitutional 'straitjacket' on the physician's ability to coun-
sel with his patient with her best medical interests in mind." Id.
82. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
83. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
84. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
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A. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc."5
Three provisions of the controversial "Akron Ordinance" ' came under
the Supreme Court's scrutiny in Akron:8 7 a second-trimester hospitaliza-
tion requirement;s8 a detailed informed consent requirement;89 and a
85. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
86. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870 (1978). This ordinance, which is popu-
larly known as the "Akron Ordinance," has served as a model of anti-abortion legislation for
several states and localities. See E. RUBIN, supra note 48, at 137.
87. Two other provisions of the Akron Ordinance were also discussed by the Court. The
first was a parental notification and consent requirement for minors. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED
ORDINANCES § 1870.05. The Court's analysis of this provision is beyond the scope of this
comment. The Court made no new pronouncements regarding a minor's right to an abortion
either in Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2499, where it struck down the parental consent require-
ment, or in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (1983), where it
upheld Missouri's parental consent statute. See J. Benshoof, The New Supreme Court
Abortion Decisions (July 18, 1983) (available from the American Civil Liberties Union Re-
productive Freedom Project, New York, New York). See generally Comment, H.L. v. Math-
eson: Can Parental Notification Be Required for Minors Seeking Abortions? 16 U. RICH. L.
REv. 429 (1982) (reviewing key Supreme Court decisions defining a minor's right to an
abortion).
The second provision discussed by the Court was a requirement that fetal remains be
"disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES §
1870.16. The Court struck down this provision on the ground that it was unconstitutionally
vague, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504. Because it does not relate to the fundamental right to abortion,
this part of the opinion is beyond the scope of this comment.
88. "No person shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman subsequent
to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy, unless such abortion is performed in a
hospital." AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCEs § 1870.03.
89. (A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be performed or induced only with
the informed written consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her parents or her
legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of
this Chapter, given freely and without coercion.
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent, an
abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she, and
one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with
Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have been orally informed by her attending phy-
sician of the following facts, and have signed a consent form acknowledging that she,
and the parent or legal guardian where applicable, have been informed as follows:
(1) That according to the best judgment of the attending physician she is
pregnant.
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of conception of her
unborn child, based upon the information provided by her as to the time of her last
menstrual period and after a history and physical examination and appropriate lab-
oratory test.
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception and
that there has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological character-
istics of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at
which time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appear-
ance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and
heart function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external
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mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period.9" With a strong majority of
six Justices, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the last
two provisions were unconstitutional but reversed the Sixth Circuit deci-
sion upholding the second-trimester hospitalization requirement.9 1 In
striking down all three provisions, the Akron decision emphatically reaf-
firms the Court's position that because a woman's decision to choose
abortion is a fundamental right, any state regulation interfering with that
members.
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving outside of
her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks have elapsed from the time of con-
ception, and that her attending physician has a legal obligation to take all reasona-
ble steps to preserve the life and health of her viable unborn child during the
abortion.
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, which can result in serious com-
plications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual distur-
bances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and
that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psycho-
logical problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to pro-
vide her with birth control information, and that her physician will provide her
with a list of such agencies and the services available if she so requests.
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to assist
her during pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the
abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or place him or her for adoption,
and that her physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services
available if she so requests.
(C) At the same time the attending physician provides the information required by
paragraph (B) of this Section, he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant woman,
and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance
with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, of the particular risks associated with her
own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed including providing her
with at least a general description of the medical instructions to be followed subse-
quent to the abortion in order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in addition pro-
vide her with such other information which in his own medical judgment is relevant
to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to term.
(D) The attending physician performing or inducing the abortion shall provide the
pregnant woman, or one of her parents or legal guardian signing the consent form
where applicable, with a duplicate copy of the consent form signed by her, and one of
her parents or her legal guardian where applicable, in accordance with paragraph (B)
of this Section.
Id. § 1870.06.
90. No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of
her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with Sec-
tion 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have signed the consent form required by Section
1870.06 of this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing that such time has
elapsed.
Id. § 1870.07.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2481.
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choice will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
B. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft9 2
The abortion provisions under scrutiny in Ashcroft were not so clearly
biased against abortion as those addressed in Akron, and thus Ashcroft
provides a good basis for comparison. Here the Court focused on four
provisions of Missouri's abortion statute:9 3 a second-trimester hospitaliza-
tion requirement;9 4 a parental consent requirement for minors;95 a re-
quirement that a pathology report be made after every abortion;9 and a
requirement that a second physician be present during an abortion per-
formed on a viable fetus.9 7 The same majority that struck down Akron's
hospitalization requirement found Missouri's hospitalization requirement
to be unconstitutional as well.98 However, the other three provisions of
the Missouri act were upheld by a plurality composed of Justices
O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist (the dissenting Justices in Akron) and
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, who had formed part of the ma-
jority in Akron.9
C. Simopoulos v. Virginia00
In Simopoulos the Court affirmed the criminal conviction of a doctor
who performed a saline abortion in violation of the Virginia abortion stat-
92. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
93. Regulation of Abortions, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010-.085 (Vernon 1983).
94. "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be
performed in a hospital." Id. § 188.025.
95. Id. § 188.028.
96. A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall be submitted
to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a copy of the tissue report
with the state division of health, and who shall provide a copy of the report to the
abortion facility or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced and the
pathologist's report shall be made a part of the patient's permanent record.
Id. § 188.047.
97. An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only when there is
in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or adducing the abor-
tion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as
a result of the abortion. During the performance of the abortion, the physician per-
forming it, and subsequent to the abortion, the physician required by this section to
be in attendance, shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical prac-
tice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable
unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of
the woman.
Id. § 188.030.3.
98. 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2520.
99. Id.
100. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
148 [Vol. 18:137
1983 ABORTION DECISIONS
ute's requirement of second-trimester hospitalization.101 Five Justices 2
upheld the hospitalization requirement because the definition of "hospi-
tal" in the Virginia Code,'0 3 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia,10" includes licensed outpatient surgical hospitals. The three dissent-
ing Justices in Akron'0 5 concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate
opinion in line with the reasoning of the Akron dissent. 06 Justice Stevens
dissented, believing that it was not clear how the Virginia Supreme Court
would interpret "hospital.'M
0 7
V. QUESTIONS ANSWERED; QUESTIONS REMAINING
An analysis of the 1983 Abortion Decisions shows how the majority
opinion in Akron clearly expresses several of the underlying themes in
Roe, Doe, and Danforth. The Ashcroft and Simopoulos decisions, in con-
trast, provide ample material for future controversy. The following dis-
cussion examines the impact of these decisions according to the issues
they address rather than through a case-by-case analysis.
A. Second-Trimester Hospitalization Requirements: Questions An-
swered in Akron; Questions Raised in Simopoulos
In Akron, the Court noted that the district court and the court of ip-
peals upheld Akron's hospitalization requirement in the belief that Roe
101. [I]t shall be lawful for any physician licensed by the Virginia Board of Medicine to
practice medicine and surgery, to terminate or attempt to terminate a human preg-
nancy or aid or assist in the termination of a human pregnancy by performing an
abortion or causing a miscarriage on any woman during the second trimester of preg-
nancy and prior to the third trimester of pregnancy provided such procedure is per-
formed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health or under the control
of the State Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-73 (RepL Vol. 1982).
102. Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun. 103 S. Ct. at 2534.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-123(1) (Repl. Vol. 1979). See infra note 104.
104. The Court cited the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Simopoulos v. Vir-
ginia, 221 Va. 1059, 1075, 277 S.E.2d 194, 204 (1981), which clearly interpreted "hospital" as
defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-123(1) (Repl. Vol. 1979), to include outpatient hospitals.
103 S. Ct. at 2537 nn.4-5. Specifically that definitional statute provides that:
"Hospital" means any facility in which the primary function is the provision of diag-
nosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, for
two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known by varying nomencla-
ture or designation such as sanatoriums, sanitariums and general, acute, short-term,
long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals. ...
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-123(1) (Repl. Vol. 1979).
105. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 2540.
107. Id. at 2540-41.
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established a brightline test authorizing such requirements after the first
trimester of pregnancy."0 8 The Court reaffirmed the applicability of Roe's
trimester framework but rejected the brightline test interpretation, stat-
ing that "the Court in Roe did not hold that it always is reasonable for a
State to adopt an abortion regulation that applies to the entire second
trimester." 0 9 Thus, the Court focused on the reasonableness of the rela-
tionship between the requirement that all second-trimester abortions be
performed in full-service, acute-care hospitals and the state's compelling
interest in maternal health.
After recognizing the burdens that a hospitalization requirement im-
poses in terms of increased costs"0 and difficulty of access,"' the Court
evaluated the reasonableness of the requirement in light of Danforth, re-
lying heavily on currently accepted medical practice. 112 Noting the desira-
bility of making the dilation and evacuation (D & E) abortion procedure
available because of its low risk," 3 the Court looked to recent recommen-
dations of the American Public Health Association and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists." 4 Both organizations en-
dorsed the view that hospitalization for second-trimester D & E abortions
does not contribute to the patients' safety." 5 Consequently, the Court
concluded that "'present medical knowledge'. . . convincingly undercuts
Akron's justification for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital.""16
108. 103 S. Ct. at 2494. See supra note 51.
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
110. An in-hospital abortion costs $850-$900, whereas a D & E performed in a clinic costs
$350-$400. Id.
111. Id. The Court noted that the unavailability of second-trimester abortions in hospi-
tals was not unique to Akron, citing Wolfe v. Stumbo, 519 F. Supp. 22, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1980),
and Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. La. 1980). 103 S. Ct. at 2495 n.21.
See also S. Henshaw, J. Forest, E. Sullivan, C. Tietze, Abortion 1977-1979, Need & Services
in the United States, Each State & Metropolitan Area, Report of the Alan Guttmacher Inst.
(1980).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
113. Id. at 2496. Before the development of the D & E procedure, an instillation proce-
dure was the safest abortion technique available during the second trimester. This method
consists of an injection of either a saline solution or prostaglandin, which induces labor.
The risk associated with the instillation method is much greater than that from a D & E
procedure because not only must the woman go through labor, but she must also wait until
approximately her 16th week of pregnancy to have the procedure performed because until
that time the amniotic sac is too small. The net result of using the D & E procedure is that
a woman may have an abortion at very low risk between the 12th and 18th weeks of preg-
nancy. See Grimes, Hulk, & McCutchen, Midtrimester Abortion by Dilation and Evacua-
tion Versus Intraamniotic Instillation of Prostaglandin: A Randomized Clinical Trial,
NEw ENG. L.J., Sept. 27, 1979, at 720.
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2496.
115. Id.
116. Id.
[Vol. 18:137
1983 ABORTION DECISIONS
Before reaching its holding that Akron's hospitalization requirement
was unconstitutional, 1 7 the Court indicated how its decision should be
interpreted. The opinion stated that a perfect fit between an abortion
regulation and the asserted state interest is not required in order for a
regulation to withstand constitutional scrutiny.11 The Akron hospitaliza-
tion requirement was unconstitutional because it burdened a woman's ac-
cess to an extremely safe abortion procedure.11
The Akron decision firmly establishes that the dictum in Roe regarding
"permissible" second-trimester regulations 20 is not controlling. The
Court also implies that, contrary to the understanding of some lower
courts, 21 increased cost can have sufficient impact on the abortion deci-
sion to invoke strict scrutiny of the trimester framework. 122 The critical
factor with regard to a second-trimester regulation is whether it reasona-
bly relates to the promotion of maternal health, and that relation in turn
will be determined according to accepted medical practice of the day. But
what the Court has granted with the right hand in terms of promoting a
woman's freedom to choose abortion, it may have taken away with the
left. This, at least, is how the Virginia Attorney General's Office has cho-
sen to interpret Simopoulos. 23
In Simopoulos, the Court determined that since Virginia's definition of
"hospital" includes outpatient surgical hospitals,124 and since Virginia's
regulations governing outpatient surgical hospitals125 "[o]n their face...
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards
.. ",28 Virginia's hospitalization requirement is not unconstitu-
tional.227 This decision is significant in light of the facts that presently in
Virginia there are only four licensed outpatient surgical hospitals 128 and
117. Id. at 2497.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
122. See supra notes 110 and accompanying text. The Court, however, is not clear as to
how great a cost differential will invoke strict scrutiny. See infra notes 166-69 and accompa-
nying text.
123. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983). See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 104.
125. Dept. of Health, Rules and Regs. for the Licensure of Hospitals in Va. pt. II (1979)
(superseded by pt. IV (1982)). The Court noted that the regulations in effect when Simo-
poulos was prosecuted had been superseded at the time of its decision but noted no signifi-
cant difference. 103 S. Ct. at 2537 n.6.
126. 103 S. Ct. at 2539.
127. Id. at 2540.
128. Ambulatory Surgical Center, Norfolk, Virginia; Fairfax Surgery Center, Fairfax, Vir-
ginia; Hampton General Outpatient Emergency Center, Hampton, Virginia; and Virginia
Heart Institute, Richmond, Virginia. Telephone call to administrator's office at each institu-
tion (Oct. 5, 1983).
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that none of those facilities performs second-trimester abortions. 2" While
Virginia's regulations governing the licensure of first-trimester abortion
clinics130 do not differ significantly from those governing outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals"1' insofar as health-related matters are concerned,13 2 pres-
ently existing first-trimester abortion clinics would have to incur signifi-
cant conversion expenses in order to meet the physical requirements for
outpatient surgical hospitals."13
The Virginia Attorney General's Office has expressed the view that,
under the 1983 Abortion Decisions, Virginia's regulations governing the
licensure of outpatient surgical hospitals do not impose an unconstitu-
tional burden on a woman's right to a second-trimester abortion.3 In
essence, this stance means that first-trimester abortion clinics in Virginia
may not perform second-trimester D & E abortions and that to date the
qualified outpatient facilities will not do so. Thus, the net effect of the
Simopoulos decision in Virginia could well be the same as if Virginia's
abortion statute restricted second-trimester abortions to acute-care hospi-
tals, i.e., a woman's ability to obtain a second-trimester abortion is se-
verely restricted."35
Whether the interpretation of the Attorney General's Office is correct is
subject to debate. On this point, two observations with respect to Simo-
poulos are noteworthy. First, the decision is in line with the Court's state-
ment in Akron that "a state abortion regulation is not unconstitutional
simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
129. Id. Ambulatory Surgical Center and Fairfax Surgery Center do perform first-tritfies-
ter abortions. Id.
130. Dept. of Health, Rules and Regs. for Licensure of Hospitals in Va. pt. V (1983).
Because many of the regulations governing first-trimester abortions are as restrictive as
those governing the out-patient surgical hospitals, they are very likely unconstitutional as
unduly restrictive of first-trimester abortions. Consequently, on November 11, 1983, the Vir-
ginia Board of Health, on the advice of counsel, gave its preliminary approval to rescind
some of the regulations. This approval is only the first step in the procedure to effect such
rescission. This preliminary approval must be followed by a public hearing; then the Board
must take final action. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 17, 1983, at B-1, col. 2.
131. Dept. of Health, Rules and Regs. for Licensure of Hospitals in Va. pt. IV (1982).
132. Compare id. pt. IV, §§ 702.0-703.10.2 (health-related regulations for outpatient sur-
gical hospitals) with id. pt. V, §§ 902.0-904.5.3 (health-related regulations for first-trimester
abortions). The health-related regulations for the first-trimester abortion clinics are more
tailored to the specific health concerns raised by abortions. See id. pt. V, §§ 903.3.1-5,
904.1.3-.3.8.
133. Telephone interview with Sally Camp, Staff Assistant, Va. Dept. of Health (Oct. 17,
1983).
134. The Attorney General's Office has not issued a formal opinion on this matter, but it
has indicated to the Department of Health that this is its official position. Id.
135. It is too early to be certain of the net effect of Simopoulos, because the licensed out-
patient surgical hospitals that perform first-trimester abortions may expand their services to
include second-trimester abortions. See supra note 128. So too, new abortion clinics may be
constructed in compliance with the regulations governing outpatient surgical hospitals.
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serted state interest."136 Patently, the Supreme Court does not want to
give a "hands off" message to the states that would deter them from tak-
ing legitimate measures to protect maternal health. On the other hand, of
obvious concern to the Court is any regulation that has "the effect of
inhibiting. . . the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks. '13 7
Second, the Court emphasizes at various points in the Simopoulos
opinion that its decision rests on the fact that Virginia's hospitalization
requirement appears to comport with accepted medical practice.138 The
Court specifically stated that it was not required to "consider whether
Virginia's regulations [governing the licensure of outpatient surgical hos-
pitals] are constitutional in every particular," 39 because the appellant
had not specifically challenged the regulations as insufficiently related to
maternal health. 4 The Court's indications are clear: If Virginia's regula-
tions governing outpatient hospitals have the effect of inhibiting "the vast
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks,"'' and do not contribute to
the safety of the abortion procedure,' 4' they are unconstitutional insofar
as they dictate where second-trimester abortions must be performed.
B. First-Trimester Regulations: When and How Does Strict Scrutiny
Apply?
In defining the permissible limits of first-trimester abortion regulations,
Akron again is the key decision. The decision reiterates the principle de-
rived from Danforth that a first-trimester abortion regulation is not un-
constitutional so long as it is supported by "important health-related
State concerns"' 4 ' and does not interfere with "physician-patient consul-
tation or with the woman's choice between abortion and childbirth.' 4 4
More importantly, the Court's examination of Akron's detailed informed
consent requirements clarifies what constitutes an "important" state in-
terest justifying a first-trimester regulation. 45 Unfortunately, the Court
does not reach a clear consensus as to when a regulation's impact is suffi-
cient to invoke strict scrutiny.146
Akron's informed consent requirement contained two features that dis-
136. 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
137. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976)).
138. 103 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
139. Id. at 2539.
140. Id.
141. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2497
(1983) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79).
142. 103 S. Ct. at 2496.
143. Id. at 2493.
144. Id.
145. See infra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
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tinguish it from the requirement upheld in Danforth.147 Akron specified a
litany of information to be given to the woman, including undeterminable
data, such as the fetus' sensitivity to pain and dubious statements with
regard to the physical and psychological consequences of abortion,'
148
which the Court termed a "parade of horribles."' 149 In addition, the ordi-
nance required that the attending physician give the informed consent
consultation.'5" The Court acknowledged that the state's legitimate inter-
est in maternal health supports the validity of an informed consent re-
quirement as a general rule, but qualified this rule as follows:
This does not mean ... that a State has unreviewable authority to decide
what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an
abortion .... [T]he State's interest in ensuring that this information be
given will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth. 15'
The Court thus rejected the interpretation of some lower courts that a
state may legitimately use informed consent statutes to promote its own
"pro-life" policies. 52
The informational requirement of Akron's informed consent provision
failed judicial scrutiny because the Court determined that it not only in-
terfered with the woman's abortion decision,5 3 but also placed the physi-
cian in an "undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket."' 54 Clearly, the
Court rejects the view expressed in Woman's Community Health Center,
Inc. v. Cohen'55 that a state's interest in promoting its pro-life policy will
support a first-trimester regulation so long as it does not constitute a di-
rect obstacle to the abortion decision.
Addressing the "attending physician" provision, 56 the Akron Court re-
jected the Sixth Circuit's determination that the provision interfered with
the physician-patient relationship in exactly the same way as that of the
informational requirement. 5 7 The Court noted that the provision re-
quired the physician to disclose general information about the abortion
procedure to be used and medical instructions to be followed after the
procedure, "properly leav[ing] the precise nature and amount of this dis-
closure to the physician's discretion and 'medical judgment.' "158 The
147. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65 (1976).
148. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES §§ 1870.06(B)(3)-(5) (1978). See supra note 89.
149. 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
150. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(C) (1978). See supra note 89.
151. 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
152. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
153. 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
154. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, n.8 (1976)).
155. 477 F. Supp. 542, 549-50 (D. Me. 1979).
156. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(C) (1978). See supra note 89.
157. 103 S. Ct. at 2501.
158. Id.
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Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision that the "attending physician"
requirement was unconstitutional, however, because there was no evi-
dence that a woman's consent would be less informed if such information
were given by someone other than the attending physician. 159
It is unclear whether the Court struck down the provision because it
recognized no legitimate state interest or because it could not find a rea-
sonable relationship between the state interest and the abortion regula-
tion.160 One explanation for this vagueness may be that, with respect to
first-trimester regulations where there is no recognized "compelling" state
interest, the legitimacy of the state interest promoted is interdependent
with the reasonableness of the regulation. Ultimately, the Court's holding
may mean that a modified version of "strict scrutiny" applies to first-
trimester regulations when there is a state interest but no apparent im-
pact on the abortion decision.' The inquiry, however, is somewhat dif-
ferent from that applied to second- and third-trimester abortion regula-
tions. Instead of focusing on the reasonableness of the relation between
the restrictions and the promotion of a compelling state interest, the fo-
cus is on the legitimacy of the state interest promoted by the regulation.
The question remains as to how great an impact a first-trimester regu-
lation must have to invoke the trimester framework. 62 The 1983 Abortion
Decisions provide no answer, although not for lack of opportunity. One of
the Missouri regulations at issue in Ashcroft was the requirement that
tissue from an aborted fetus be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion. 6 3 Justice Powell, in an opinion joined only by Chief Justice Bur-
ger,'" expressed the view that the pathology report requirement was sup-
159. Id. at 2502.
160. Id. at 2502-03. On the one hand, the Court implies that the state has no legitimate
interest-
We are not convinced, however, that there is as vital a state need for insisting that
the physician performing the abortion, or for that matter any physician, personally
counsel the patient in the absence of a request. The State's interest is in ensuring
that the woman's consent is informed and unpressured ....
Id. at 2502. On the other hand, the Court implies that the state does have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that the physician does not abdicate his role as the person responsible
for the medical aspects of the abortion decision but determined that the specific require-
ment at issue was "unreasonable." Id. at 2502-03.
161. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 81 (1976), which implied that,
where a first-trimester regulation is supported by a legitimate state interest and has no
significant impact on the abortion decision, a rational relationship between the state interest
and the regulation is sufficient. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
162. Application of the trimester framework to first-trimester regulations is essentially
the same as saying they are unconstitutional on their face because first-trimester regulation
is unconstitutional. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
163. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.047 (Vernon 1983). See supra note 96.
164. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented from this portion of
Justice Powell's opinion. 103 S. Ct. at 2526-28. Justices O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist
concurred in the judgment. 103 S. Ct. at 2532.
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ported by important health objectives,6 5 that the additional cost imposed
did not significantly burden the abortion decision,'6" and therefore, that
the requirement did not violate the right to an abortion.17
In Justice Blackmun's dissenting view,6 " the added cost of the pathol-
ogy report did constitute a legally significant impact and therefore ex-
ceeded the constitutional limits of first-trimester regulation. 6 9 Implicit in
this view is the application of the trimester framework. Blackmun further
concluded that the pathology report requirement was invalid because it
did not further "important health-related state concerns."' 70
The split of the Court on the pathology report requirement illustrates
the Court's division into three factions on the abortion issue. The liberal
faction, led by Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe decision, would
strictly scrutinize any first-trimester regulation with a negative impact on
the abortion decision.' 7 1 The middle view, adopted by Justice Powell and
Chief Justice Burger, holds that perhaps overly-cautious first-trimester
regulations promulgated in furtherance of health concerns should be per-
missible so long as they do not constitute an apparent departure from
accepted medical practice and do not inhibit the decision to have an
abortion. 7 2 Finally, the youngest members of the Court, Justices
O'Connor and Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, would permit all abor-
tion regulations that are "rationally" related to a legitimate state interest
and do not impose an "undue burden" on the abortion decision."' Be-
cause of these divisions, it is difficult to speculate how the Court may
ultimately define what constitutes a "legally significant impact." The lib-
eral faction needs to sway only one other Justice in order to form a ma-
jority. But three of the four Justices comprising this faction (Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall)" 4 are among the oldest on the Court. At the
other extreme, the conservative wing must sway at least two votes to gain
165. 103 S. Ct. at 2523-24. The Court noted that recorded pathology reports, combined
with abortion complication records, could provide a statistical basis for studying the cause
of complications. Id. at 2523.
166. Id. at 2524.
167. Id. at 2524-25.
168. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens. Id. at 2526.
169. Id. at 2528-29.
170. Id. at 2528 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 2481, 2493 (1983)). In reaching this conclusion, Blackmun appears to apply "mod-
ified strict scrutiny," and examines the legitimacy of the purported state interest. See supra
notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
171. 103 S. Ct. at 2528.
172. Id. at 2523-25.
173. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2510
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. Justice Stevens is the fourth member of the liberal faction. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (1983).
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the majority, but Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, as the youngest
members of the Court, may well have time on their side.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE SPECTRE OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
That the 1983 Abortion Decisions constitute a major victory for pro-
choice advocates is undebatable. In and of themselves, the decisions in-
validate or throw into question second-trimester hospitalization require-
ments in at least twenty states.175 The Court stands firm on the principle
that a woman's right to choose abortion is protected by the Constitution
as a fundamental right. And yet no one expects the 1983 Abortion Deci-
sions to lay the abortion issue to rest. To the contrary, most expect the
decisions to galvanize the efforts of the pro-life movement. 7 6 In light of
this prediction, Justice O'Connor's forceful dissent in Akron'77 must be
considered.
This dissent stops just short of calling for a reversal of Roe v. Wade.' s7
Justice O'Connor convincingly argues that the trimester framework is a
completely unworkable basis for analyzing abortion restrictions because
medical technology, while moving to a later stage in the pregnancy the
point at which the state may regulate in the interest of maternal health,
is simultaneously moving to an earlier stage the moment of viability,179
which triggers the state's interest in protecting potential life. "The Roe
framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself."'
80
175. See J. Benshoof, The New Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, Appendix A (July 18,
1983) (available from the American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom Project,
New York, New York) (listing states that have second-trimester hospitalization require-
ments, either by criminal statute or by health code regulation, and including indications of
how each state defines the term "hospital").
176. See The Court Stands by Abortion, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1983, at 62; Holding Firm
on Abortion, Thm, June 27, 1983, at 14.
177. 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504 (1983).
178. Justice O'Connor appears to question the validity of Roe when she states:
The parties in these cases have not asked the Court to reexamine the validity of that
holding and the court below did not address it. Accordingly, the Court does not re-
examine its previous holding. Nonetheless, it is apparent from the Court's opinion
that neither sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based on the
application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework that var-
ies according to the "stages" of pregnancy ....
103 S. Ct. at 2504.
179. For interesting commentary and proposed solutions to this dilemma see generally
Note, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29
UCLA L. REv. 1194 (1982) (suggesting that viability should mean the point at which the
fetus has consciousness, as determined by an electroencephalogram); Note, Fetal Viability
and Individual Autonomy: Resolving Medical and Legal Standards for Abortion, 27 UCLA
L. REv. 1340 (1980) (viability should mean the point at which the fetus can survive outside
the womb without artificial support).
180. 103 S. Ct. at 2507.
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Justice O'Connor proposes that the better standard for review of abor-
tion regulations is simply a test of "undue burden," and contends that
this standard is the one more strongly supported by recent abortion deci-
sions.'8 ' She maintains that the state's interests in protecting maternal
health and potential life are compelling at all stages of pregnancy182 and
concludes that, so long as the impact of an abortion regulation is not "un-
duly burdensome," strict scrutiny is inappropriate. 83 It is sufficient that
the regulation is "rationally related to the legitimate government objec-
tive of protecting potential life."'' Applying this standard of review, the
dissenting Justices would have upheld all the regulations under challenge
in the 1983 Abortion Decisions, except possibly portions of Akron's in-
formed consent requirement."8 5
Noticeably absent from O'Connor's proposal of an "undue burden"
standard is any substantive justification for not applying strict scrutiny
when a regulation has a legally significant impact on the abortion deci-
sion. 188 Future cases may well require the Court to adapt the trimester
framework, or even to change it to conform to advances in medical tech-
nology, but this possibility should not pose a problem. The Court has
already recognized that the trimester framework is not a brightline
test, 1 7 and has made clear its position that the principles of Roe are to be
applied in light of the current state of medical art. 88 The trimester
framework is not the essence of Roe. Rather, the resounding theme of Roe
and its progeny, including most recently the 1983 Abortion Decisions, is
that a woman's freedom to choose abortion is a fundamental right. As
such, the choice must be free from state interference, except to the extent
that state interests in maternal health and potential life outweigh this
right. Even then, any state regulation impinging on the abortion decision
"must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
181. Id. at 2505. Justice O'Connor agrees with the line of thinking in some lower courts
that the holdings in the abortion funding restriction cases (i.e., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)) are directly applicable to cases involving
procedural regulations. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
182. 103 S. Ct. at 2509.
183. Id. at 2510.
184. Id. at 2512 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
185. 103 S. Ct. at 2512-15. It is not certain that Justice O'Connor would have struck down
the informational requirements of Ohio's informed consent statute, to which Justice Powell
referred as the "parade of horribles." See supra note 149 and accompanying text. O'Connor
dismissed these provisions "because it appears that the City of Akron conceded their uncon-
stitutionality . . . ." 103 S. Ct. at 2515.
186. In arguing that strict scrutiny should apply only when there is a heavy burden on the
fundamental right, Justice O'Connor did not cite a single abortion case. Rather, she cited
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973), an equal protection
case. 103 S. Ct. at 2510.
187. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2494
(1983).
188. Id. at 2496.
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stake."1 9 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court will adopt the dissenting
view and limit the application of strict scrutiny to only those abortion
regulations that constitute an "undue burden," as defined by Justice
O'Connor.1 90
Laura Fox
189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
190. Implicit in Justice O'Connor's view of when strict scrutiny should apply is the belief
that nothing less than a direct obstacle constitutes an "undue burden." 103 S. Ct. at 2512-
16.
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